

Whitepaper

- Malware In Bitmap

888

C3 8C5141 005250 41 48 56 51 65C3 92 3152C2 8B48C2 8B48C2 8B4860 48 185220 52

C28B72

xor [edx mov – dec [edx sbb push edx ret 0x72

m = + + + - O(m + A + O)



Defense Evasion - Malware In Bitmap

Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. In this report, we focus on how we uncover latest obfuscation / masquerading techniques that involve hidden payload in image with bitmap extension

Delivering payloads through Images - Use cases

Because the BMP file format is an uncompressed graphics file format, this gives malicious actors the possibilities of injecting various payload and script into it.

The study of the structure of a PNG image also revealed possibilities of encoding web shells, XSS payloads into the PNG IDAT chunks.

In 2019, polyglot images were used to hide malvertising attacks by some hacking group.

Of recent, Lazarus APT group is known to employ new techniques and custom toolsets in its operations to increase effectiveness of it attacks, and in one of their new campaign, they resorted to an interesting technique of BMP files embedded with malicious HTA objects to drop its loader.

Report from Cisco Talos new research also revealed that cybercriminals are now deploying remote access Trojans (RATs) under the guise of seemingly innocuous images hosted on infected websites, once again highlighting how threat actors quickly change tactics when their attack methods are discovered and exposed publicly

Extracting & Analyzing payload from BMP

Our goals here is to extract the payload from the identified malicious BMP file, execute it in a sandbox and capture the C2 of the malicious payload hidden within the image.

Steps taken:

- Identify malware type
- Extract the malware and Execute in a sandbox!
- Examine communication initiated by the malware



Identifying the malware type!

12	① 12 security vendors flagged this file as malicious			0 X
7 58 2 Community V	2e4aab63d4d9494a2d94eb302e056a9e971fbfbe71cc3bcb98c8744ed085f222 download.bmp bmp		148.41 KB 2021-04-20 11:24:25 UTC Size 19 days ago	BPM
DETECTION DI	ETAILS COMMUNITY			
Ad-Aware	() Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	AegisLab	1 Trojan.Win32.Generic.4lc	
ALYac	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	Arcabit	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	
BitDefender	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	Emsisoft	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690 (B))
eScan	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	FireEye	Generic.Exploit.Metasploit.2.4F704690	
GData	Generic Exploit Metasploit 2.4F704690	Kaspersky	() HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic	
Sangfor Engine Zero	Trojan.Generic-Script.Save.a4f24852	ZoneAlarm by Check Point	() HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic	
AhnLab-V3	O Undetected	Antiy-AVL	Undetected	
Avast	O Undetected	Avira (no cloud)	O Undetected	
Baidu	O Undetected	BitDefenderTheta	Undetected	
Bkav Pro	O Undetected	CAT-QuickHeal	O Undetected	
ClamAV	O Undetected	CMC	O Undetected	
Comodo	Undetected	Cynet	O Undetected	

This was straightforward, we decided to run the file through VT and it gave us these results.

Seeing as most of these results identify it as a **"Generic Metasploit Exploit"**, we can assume the malware embedded in the image is in-fact a Metaploit payload.

Extract the malware and Execute in a sandbox!

To extract a piece of malware, first we need to locate where it is hidden. But this is a simple task as it is evident where it resides.





At the bottom of this section of the image, you'll notice *multi-coloured pixels*, these pixels are raw binary data encoded into RGB and stored in the image, thus a color of purple will be decoded to the binary sequence *0xff 0x00 0xff*.

With this in mind, a script was written to extract the payload and dump it in its binary form.



This script implements the following algorithm, "for each non-white pixel at the bottom of this image, convert its RGB values to bytes and print them out". Which gives us what we have in the image below!



And when disassembled, it gives us this code.



00000000	620240	xat 0-4002
00000000	C28348	iet 0x4883
00000003	0.3	Iet
00000004	BCC3ABC3B0	mov esp, expecsaecs
00000009	C3	IEL
0000000A	A4	movsb
0000008B	0000	add [eax],al
0000000D	C3	ret
0000000E	8C5141	mov [ecx+0x41],ss
00000011	005250	add [edx+0x50],dl
00000014	41	inc ecx
00000015	48	dec eax
00000016	56	push esi
00000017	51	push ecx
00000018	65C3	gs ret
0000001A	92	xchg eax,edx
00000018	3152C2	xor [edx-0x3e],edx
0000001E	8B48C2	mov ecx,[eax-0x3e]
00000021	8B486Ø	mov ecx,[eax+0x60]
00000024	48	dec eax
00000025	185220	sbb [edx+0x20],dl
00000028	52	push edx
00000029	C28872	ret 0x728b
0000002C	C28848	ret Øx488b
0000002F	0F48504A	cmovs edx,[eax+0x4a]
00000033	4A	dec edx
00000034	C2B7C3	ret 0xc3b7
00000037	8931	mov [ecx],esi
00000039	4D	dec ebp
0000003A	C3	ret
00000038	803148	xor byte [ecx],0x48
0000003E	61	рора
0000003F	3CC2	cmp al,0xc2
00000041	AC	lodsb
00000042	2C02	sub al,0x2
00000044	7CC3	il 0x9
00000046	814120410DC389	add dword [ecx+0x20].0x89c30d41
0000004D	C3	ret
0000004E	A2C3810141	mov [0x410181c3].al
00000053	52	push edx
00000054	C3	ret
00000055	AD	lodsd
00000056	C28B48	ret Øx488b
00000059	51	push ecx
0000005A	C28820	ret 0x208b
00000050	52	push edx
0000005E	48	dec eax
0000005E	3C42	cmp_al.0x42
00000061	66C3	retw
00000063	90	non
000000064	0118	add [eax]_ebx
000000055	7802	is 0x2a
000000058	810F02080072	or dword [edi] 8x72888b82
000000005	C285C2	Tet 0xc285
0000000C	C203C2	IEC OAC205

Now that we have the malware, we can examine it.

This is where we hit our first roadblock, the malware has no evident IP string in the code which means one of two things.



- The IP is stored as a list of numbers
- The binary is encoded

After some research, we came to the conclusion that the file was encoded using the "shigata ga nai" payload encoder for Metasploit which uses rolling keys to decode itself multiple times before executing. With this information, we tried using *shell-code decoders* that emulate the program and dump its memory.

After the first two successful cycles of decoding, our decoder crashes with the error "Invalid opcode" which signifies that the result of the previous cycle is not a valid binary.

This is where we broke off from the conventional/recommended method of solving the problem and decided to think of our own solution.

Execute the malware in a sandbox!

The thought was, "If we can't force it to decode itself then we should let it do so naturally". Thus we found a script that executed malware embedded in images and gave it a go.

Its name is "*NativePayload_Image.cs*", it is a C# script that extracted the payload similar to our python script but then executes the script by changing its own instruction pointer to the beginning of the payload, forcing the kernel to execute it as part of the script.

We started a Windows command prompt with the command "wine64 cmd" and executed the "NativePayload_Image.exe" once more.

Z:\home\neutrino2211\native_payload>NativePayload_Image.cs.exe bitmap download.bmp 510 54 00a8:fixme:ntdll:NtQuerySystemInformation info_class SYSTEM_PERFORMANCE_INFORMATION
NativePayload_Image Tool , Published by Damon Mohammadbagher , April 2017 Detecting/Injecting Meterpreter Payload bytes from BMP Image Files
<pre>[+] Detecting Meterpreter Payload bytes by Image Files [+] File Scanning [+] Reading Payloads from "download.bmp" file [+] Scanning Payload with length 510 from byte 54</pre>
Bingo Meterpreter session by BMP images ;)



Examine communication initiated by the malware

While all this was running, we set up Wireshark in the background to monitor all communication and after a few seconds of listening, we terminated the malware and examined the packets.

We used the filter, **tcp.port == 4444** to filter all non-Metasploit payload communication as port **4444** is the default port for all communication on Metasploit TCP payloads.

This resulted in us getting the IP address of the C2 server.



Further Analysis of C2 IP

IP was further analyzed which reveal detection of 4 malicious files communicating with it





Detected Files Hashes - SHA 256

3b66ae16fb01dcd20dd62e46c875de12aefafc18e76e03b251bade70757ff34b ef4bc0076b35dc49febf4ea203891fa60e3b7da5ab93a8d92e16ade0c05a1ec5 10701b2debf74c30559bff2a7dbdf32e8225a648d661e77bd34cb4f205d000bd 3366222f99dd758e5e46382126348f566d38923f30d6b964908432778b5c2326

Conclusion

These and many other approaches are clever methods used by threat actors to bypass security mechanisms that can detect embedded objects within images.

To this end, we advise individuals and businesses to ensure security controls such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) are installed on all critical systems in their environment to protect and provide early detection against all these deceptive tactics and techniques that are currently use by adversaries. For more technical information around deployment of security controls, and other managed security services, contact CyberPlural. Visit our website

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